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AFDC WORK INCENTIVE ANOMALY
A soundly administered public assistance program should
provide aid to poor families without removing their incentive to
provide for themselves. The Social Security Act 1 provides ad-
ministrative guidelines for state programs that grant "Aid to
Families with Dependent Children" (AFDC). 2  AFDC is a
cooperative federal-state plan 3 designed to assist families with
"dependent children." 4  A primary goal of the program is to en-
courage appropriate family members to find and maintain
employment.5 With this goal in mind, Congress created the
"earned income disregard" 6 (EID), which directs state agencies to
disregard from a family's income base $30 plus one-third of the
monthly earned income of qualified family members.7
Welfare agencies apply the EID when calculating the income
of "direct recipients"- those individuals whose needs are fully or
partially met by the AFDC payments. 8  For example, in a father-
less family with "dependent children," the mother will receive an
EID if part of the AFDC grant is for her personal support. Most,
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
2 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
3 State programs that comply with the federal statutes receive AFDC funds. In 1975,
the AFDC program had 11,389,000 recipients and a total cost of $9,348,900,000. Soc. SEC.
BULL-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 175, at 186.
4 The Act defines "dependent child" as "a needy child ... who has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent" and is living with a parent or other relative. 42
U.S.C. § 606(a) (1976). The Act charges state agencies with developing eligibility standards
concerning financial need, but gives the states considerable latitude in formulating these
standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976). State agencies must consider a family's income
and resources in determining eligibility. See id.; 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii) (1979). Some
states also provide allowances for shelter, fuel, and various living expenses. See, e.g., 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.1 (1980).
5 S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-59, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2834, 2994-96.
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A) (1976). For a discussion of congressional policy, see
notes 30-34 and accompanying text infra.
7 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1976). The EID allows the worker to "keep" some of his
earned income because the AFDC grant is only reduced by a portion of the worker's net
earned income.
8 Direct AFDC recipients should be distinguished from other family members whose
personal support needs are not met by the AFDC payment. This Note avoids the term
'recipient" because its scope is at issue in some cases. See note 34 infra. Furthermore, the
term "recipient" is conceptually imprecise because it fails to distinguish between direct re-
cipients and other members of the AFDC family who may benefit indirectly from the
AFDC payments.
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states only allow the EID to direct recipients of AFDC.9 Thus, in
the example given, the mother will not receive an EID if her
earned income is sufficient to meet her personal support needs 10
or if she is supported by a non-AFDC source, such as a second
husband." Most agencies will deny this mother the EID even if
they include her earned income as a resource when calculating
the AFDC grant for the direct recipient children.
In limiting the EID to direct recipients, state agencies misin-
terpret the AFDC statutory provisions and undercut the primary
goals of the program. Although the issue has not been widely liti-
gated, 12 it involves policy considerations that pervade the welfare
program. Agencies would better implement these policies by
granting the EID to "legally responsible relative caretakers"
(caretakers) 13 who are not direct recipients of AFDC.
State welfare agencies offer three arguments for limiting the
EID to direct recipients: (1) an interpretation of section 602(a)(8)
of the amended Social Security Act and the relevant federal regu-
lations; (2) an application of the EID disallowance in section
602(a)(8)(D); and (3) a desire to decrease welfare rolls and reduce
program costs. Upon close scrutiny, each argument fails.
Section 602(a)(8) of the amended Social Security Act 14 estab-
lishes standards for determining whether a working member of
an AFDC family is eligible for an EID:
9 The Cornell Law Review surveyed state welfare agencies' positions on this issue in
October-November 1979. Of the 41 states responding, 39 allow the EID only to direct
recipients. Two states indicated that they would apply the EID to family members who
were not direct recipients if they contributed to the support of direct recipient members.
The responses of the agencies and tabulation of the results are on file at the Cornell Law
Review.
10 See, e.g., Cirrana v. D'Elia, 96 Misc. 2d 994, 410 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (error
for state agency to deny EID to a self-sufficient working mother who is not a direct reci-
pient), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 591, 415 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Dep't 1979). See note 34 infra.
11 See, e.g., Percey v. Blum, No. 79-CV-308 (N.D.N.Y. filed May 9, 1979).
12 None of the 41 states responding to the survey have litigated this issue. See generally
note 9 supra. But see note 34 infra (discussing Cirrana v. D'Elia, 96 Misc. 2d 994, 410 N.Y.S.
2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 591, 415 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Dep't 1979)).
13 A "legally responsible relative caretaker" is an AFDC family member who is related
to direct recipient family members and who is obligated by the state law to support the
direct recipients. Complaint, Percey v. Blum, No. 79-CV-308 (N.D.N.Y., filed May 9, 1979).
In a family receiving AFDC benefits, the working mother is a legally responsible relative
caretaker regardless of whether she is a direct recipient. Other examples include step-
fathers, grandparents, or other persons who adopt or otherwise assume legal responsibility
for the children. The earned income of a caretaker is attributable as a resource to the
direct recipient family members. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(vi) (1979). Agencies deter-
mine the caretaker's expected contribution to support needy family members by subtract-
ing the amount of income necessary to support the caretaker from the caretaker's net
income.
14 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1976).
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[T]he State agency ... shall with respect to any month disre-
gard ... in the case of earned income of a dependent child not
included under clause (i), a relative receiving such aid, and any
other individual (living in the same home as such relative and
child) whose needs are taken into account in making such de-
termination, the first $30 of the total of such earned income for
such month plus one-third of the remainder of such in-
come .... 15
Many state welfare agencies claim that this provision and its im-
plementing federal regulation 16 limit the EID to direct recipients
of AFDC."7 The statutory language, however, is ambiguous. The
section distinguishes between children or relatives receiving aid,
and "any other individual," which suggests that the EID should
not be limited to direct recipients. But the provision only refers to
other individuals "whose needs are taken into account in making
such determination." Most states argue that this qualifying clause
limits the EID to direct recipients because the individual's needs
must be part of the AFDC grant. This language, however, may
encompass any individual whose resources are considered in cal-
culating the family's needs.' 8 The provision offers little guidance
for determining which interpretation is correct.' 9
A comparison of section 602(a)(7) 2 with section 602(a)(8)
suggests that the latter is designed to allow EIDs to working fam-
ily members who are not direct recipients of AFDC. Employing
similar language, section 602(a)(7) describes the method for cal-
culating the financial need of direct AFDC recipients:
[T]he State agency shall, in determining need, take into consid-
eration any other income and resources of any child or relative
claiming aid to families with dependent children, or of any
other individual (living in the same home as such child and rel-
ative) whose needs the State determines should be considered
in determining the need of the child or relative. .... 21
15 Id. Clause (i) provides a full disregard for all earned income of children receiving aid
who qualify as full-time or part-time students. Id. § 602(a)(8)(A)(i).
16 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(11)(ii)(b) (1979) (allowing disregard only to individuals
"whose needs are included in the family grant").
17 See generally note 8 supra.
11 Even if a caretaker is not a direct recipient, his income is taken into account in
calculating the resources available to sustain the dependent children. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii) (1979).
19 The implementing regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1 1)(ii)(b) (1979), is similarly am-
biguous. It allows the EID only to those "whose needs are included in the family grant." Id.
20 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976).
21 Id.
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Section 602(a)(7) requires state agencies to 'consider all sources of
support when determining a direct recipient's need.2 The provi-
sion achieves this result by including the income and resources of
"any other individual ... whose needs ... should be considered in
determining the need of the child or relative .... ," 23 This lan-
guage, which closely parallels section 602(a)(8), must refer to
other than direct recipients. Otherwise, when dependent children
are the family's only direct recipients; agencies would not have to
consider support contributed by working parents. Such a narrow
interpretation would cause AFDC rolls to mushroom. The more
reasonable interpretation is that the language in section 602(a)(7)
refers to others than direct recipients. Agencies should interpret
section 602(a)(8) consistently by also allowing the EID to caretak-
ers who are not direct recipients.
Some state agencies also rely on section 602(a)(8)(D) 24 and
the relevant federal regulation 25 as a reason for denying the EID
to caretakers who are not direct recipients. 26 Section 602(a)(8)(D)
provides:
[T]he State agency shall not disregard any earned income ...
of ... any of such person specified in clause (ii) of subpara-
graph (A) if with respect to such month the income of the per-
sons so specified (within the meaning of clause (7)) was in ex-
cess of their need as determined by the State agency pursuant
to clause (7) (without regard to clause (8)) .... 27
Many agencies conclude from this language that individuals are
ineligible for the EID if their income exceeds their need. These
agencies maintain that only direct recipients, therefore, may re-
ceive an EID.
22 See Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356, 361 (1st Cir.) (allowing state agency to con-
sider third party payments to direct recipient's mortgagee as "currently available resource"
to direct recipient), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974). The regulation implementing
§ 602(a)(7) echoes the policy of broad inclusion of resources by allowing the state to con-
sider "all ... income and resources ... in relation to the State's need standard" except
those specifically excluded. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(A) (1979).
23 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)(7) (1976).
24 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(D) (1976).
25 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(11)(ii)(b)(2) (1979).
26 See, e.g., Answer, Percey v. Blum, No. 79-CV-308 (N.D.N.Y., filed May 9, 1979).
27 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(D) (1976). See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1 1)(ii)(b)(2) (1979) (provid-
ing that "the State agency will not disregard earned income for a month of the persons in
a family ... if the total income of such persons for such month exceeds their need as
determined without application" of the disregard provisions).
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This interpretation ignores the limited purpose of section
602(a)(8)(D). Congress created the disallowance to insure that the
EID would not increase the number of individuals eligible for di-
rect welfare payments.28 When an individual applies for AFDC
payments for his personal support, section 602(a)(8)(D) prohibits
the agency from applying the EID if the individual's resources
already exceed his needs. Thus, the provision prevents the EID
from lowering a self-sufficient applicant's recognized income into
the area of eligibility for direct AFDC payments. The section does
not apply to caretakers who are not themselves applicants for aid,
but who contribute to direct recipients. Therefore, it does not bar
an agency from granting the EID to caretakers who are not direct
recipients. 29
The underlying policy of the AFDC program and the specific
goals of the EID provision support this interpretation. The pri-
mary purpose of AFDC is to provide for dependent children.30
The design of the system, however, also emphasizes the important
policy considerations regarding family structure. 31  For this
28 The House Report accompanying the 1967 amendments to the Act reflects this con-
cern.
The bill contains provisions which will prevent increasing the number of
persons receiving assistance as a result of the earnings exemptions. The [EID]
provisions discussed above are to become available only with respect to persons
whose income was not in excess of their needs as determined by the State
agency without the application of this provision for the disregarding of income.
That is, only if a family's total income falls below the standard of need will the
earnings exemption be available.
H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1967).
The secondary purpose of § 602(a)(8)(D) is to allow the EID to self-sufficient appli-
cants who were direct recipients "for any one of the four months preceding such month" of
application. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(D) (1976). Congress designed this provision, incorporated
in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(11)(ii)(b)(2) (1979), to allow direct recipients to experiment in the
job market without sacrificing their AFDC payments. H.R. REP. No. 544, supra, at 107.
29 Congress did not intend for this statutory provision to deny the EID work incentive
to caretakers. At best, this analysis shows that Congress did not foresee the particular prob-
lem. Therefore, agencies should examine the goals of the program to ascertain the proper
policy, rather than rely on a literal interpretation of an arguably inapplicable statutory
provision.
3' In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), the Supeme Court struck down Alabama's
"substitute father" regulation, which denied AFDC payments to the children of mothers
who cohabit. The Court held that the state could not discourage the parent's illicit behavior
by punishing the children, id. at 325, and stated, "the core of any ... plan must be the
child." Id. at 328 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935)). For a brief
explanation of "dependent children," see note 4 supra.
" The preamble to the AFDC statute states that one program goal is to "help maintain
and strengthen family life." 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). Moreover, the House Ways and Means
Committee Report accompanying the 1967 amendments proposed alternative work pro-
grams designed to help "strengthen family life." H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 96
(1967). See also Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1973) ("The AFDC provisions
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reason, the program evaluates financial need by considering the
resources of the family as a whole. 32  Similarly, Congress de-
signed the EID to provide work incentives for the entire fam-
ily. 33 Agencies that limit the EID to direct recipients undercut
these goals by eliminating work incentives for many caretakers.34
of the Social Security Act envision aid to strengthen the entire family unit, including the
dependent child's parent, so as to encourage the care of the child within his own home."),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 920 (1975).
'2 The House Report accompanying the 1967 amendments emphasized the need to
examine the family as a unit and the interchange of support among all family members.
See H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1967). The states' restrictive view of the
EID provision, however, reflects an excessive concern for the individuals' separate eligibil-
ity for direct payments.
33 The Senate Finance Committee report that accompanied the 1967 amendments add-
ing the EID provisions stated: "The committee believes that this provision will furnish
incentives for members of public assistance families to take employment and, in many cases,
increase their earnings to the point where they become self-supporting." S. REP. No.
744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2995. The Finance Committee wanted to encourage "appropriate" family members to
work, not just those members receiving direct welfare payments. Id. at 3-5, [1967] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2837. See also H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 106
(1967) (emphasizing a "family plan for employment"); id. at 3 ("exempt[ing] a portion of
earned income for members of the family who can work so that they will have an incentive
to seek employment"). An "appropriate" family member is any member of an AFDC family
who contributes earned income to support direct recipients, thereby reducing the family
grant. The House Report suggested this broad interpretation in its proposal that states
should provide day care services "to make it possible for adult members of the family to
take training and employment." Id. at 97.
Because the primary goal of AFDC is to provide for dependent children, employment
under the work incentive program should not result in a reduction, or stagnation of the
children's available support. The EID is probably the only way to attain this goal under the
present program. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra.
11 Cirrana v. D'Elia, 96 Misc.2d 994, 410 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d
591, 415 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Dep't 1979), one of the few court decisions on point, directly
supports these policy arguments. In Cirrana, a state agency had denied a caretaker-mother
an EID because she earned enough money to support herself. The agency claimed that the
mother was not an AFDC "recipient" as required by the New York welfare regulations. See
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.20(2) (1980). The state court invalidated the agency denial, interpret-
ing the New York regulation to avoid non-compliance with the federal AFDC provisions.
The court reasoned that since Congress intended AFDC grants to benefit the entire family
unit, the state's position that a mother obligated to support her needy children was not a
"recipient" was contrary to Congress' legislative purpose. Furthermore, the court noted
that the state's narrow definition of "recipient" bore no rational relation to Congress' goal
of creating an incentive for AFDC family members to seek work. For these reasons, the
court held that the mother, who was not herself a direct AFDC recipient, was nevertheless
eligible for the EID. 96 Misc.2d at 995-96, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37.
One state agency also appears to allow the EID to caretakers who are not direct reci-
pients. Using an expansive definition of "recipient," West Virginia allows the EID to a
working mother whose needs are being met by a second husband if she chooses "to be
included in the AFDC payment" by allowing her assets and income to be considered as a
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:934
For example, if the mother of a family with direct recipient
children is denied the EID because she is supported by a second
husband, she may choose not to work since her additional earn-
ings would reduce, by an equal amount, the grant for the direct
recipient children. 35  If the mother chooses not to work, the fam-
ily income will stagnate and may never reach self-sufficiency
levels. The children would suffer from the lack of improvement
in the family's standard of living, thus defeating the primary purpose
of AFDC.36  Similarly, the goals of the program are frustrated if
the caretaker-mother works without the disregard because the
mother's earnings would not boost the family's net income as long
as the children remain direct recipients.3 7  This result is inequita-
ble to the family 38 and the worker.39
Some state agencies argue, however, that granting the EID to
caretakers who are not direct recipients will increase the welfare
resource to the direct recipients. Letter from West Virginia Dep't of Welfare to Cornell
Law Review (Oct. 31, 1979) (on file at Cornell Law Review). The state agency said that "[iun
this situation, [the caretaker] may be eligible for the earned income disregard since she
would be a member of the benefit group." Id.
" See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(A) (1979).
36 This point raises the problem of horizontal equity in administering the disregard. See
R. TAFT, WELFARE ALTERNATIVES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS BASED UPON THE
PUBLIC WELFARE STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND RELATED MATERIALS, JOINT COMM.
PRINT, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WELFARE ALTERNATIVES]. Appli-
cation of the disregard gives the direct recipient caretaker incentive to work and, if the
caretaker works, benefits the children. Denial of the EID to caretakers who are not direct
recipients denies similarly situated children this potential benefit. See note 38 and accom-
panying text infra.
31 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(A) (1979).
38 The result again presents a horizontal equity problem because the children are de-
nied the benefit of the caretaker's "retained income"-income the caretaker keeps through
application of the EID-simply because the caretaker is not a direct recipient. If the
caretaker was a direct recipient, the EID would apply and the entire family unit would
benefit from the retained income.
'9 The program treats the working mother's entire income as available to the direct
recipients because the mother is legally obligated to support her children. Nevertheless,
agencies deny the mother the EID simply because she is not herself needy-eligible for
direct aid. The only difference between the needy and non-needy caretaker is that the
former's income is considered available for personal support and the latter's income is
considered available for the support of needy dependent relatives. The earned incomes of
both the direct recipient mother and the caretaker-mother in our example reduce the
grant to direct recipients. Therefore, distinguishing between the two conflicts with the goal
of creating work incentives for "appropriate" family members. See note 33 supra. If a
caretaker's available income and resources exceed the eligibility level for direct AFDC
payments, the state agency should respond by terminating the caretaker's direct payments.
It should not deny the individual the EID, however, since the caretaker is still obligated to
contribute to the support of her needy children.
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rolls. For example, one agency reasoned that it should deny the
EID because "the intent of Congress in amending the law to pro-
vide for the disregard was to provide an incentive to welfare reci-
pients to go to work and 'to get people off AFDC rolls, not put
them on.' "40 This argument misstates the issue. If a state agency
allows the EID to a caretaker who is not a direct recipient, the
agency does not place the .caretaker on the welfare rolls, and he
does not become eligible for direct payments. The EID only af-
fects the amount of benefits paid to current direct recipients.
Furthermore, the number of direct recipients would remain the
same because agencies must determine eligibility for AFDC benefits
before applying the disregard. 41  Therefore, the EID would have
no immediate impact on welfare rolls.
More important, if welfare agencies allow the EID to caretak-
ers who are not direct recipients, AFDC costs will probably de-
crease.42  The fundamental assumption of the EID provision is
that it encourages family members to work.43 If an unemployed
40 Letter from Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitation Services to Cornell Law Re-
view (Nov. 5, 1979) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1967)) (on file at
Cornell Law Review).
" See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
42 Indeed, taxpayer concern over the cost of welfare was a primary consideration in the
drafting of the 1967 amendments. The House Ways and Means Committee reported:
Your committee is very deeply concerned that such a large number of
families have not achieved independence ... and is very greatly concerned over
the rapidly increasing costs to the taxpayers. Moreover, your committee is
aware that the growth in this program has received increasingly critical public
attention.
The committee is recommending the enactment of a series of amendments to
carry out its firm intent of reducing the AFDC rolls by restoring more families
to employment and self-reliance, thus reducing the Federal financial involve-
ment in the program. These changes are-
(2) A requirement that all States have an earnings exemption to provide
incentives for work by AFDC recipients.
H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97 (1967).
42 The Joint Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy stated:
[T~he passage in 1967 of both the AFDC work registration requirement and the
partial disregard of earned income for benefit determination purposes appa-
rently did lead to increases in recipients' labor force participation in some
States. However, these changes generally were greatest in States where the
earnings disregard was liberalized most markedly from prior practice. There is
no concrete evidence whether the work registration requirement itself made
much of a contribution to these successes.
WELFARE ALTERNATIVES, supra note 36, at 12-13. Although critics may argue that the EID
will not encourage many unemployed caretakers to work, this cannot justify denying the
EID to certain family members when Congress has decided that the incentive is sufficiently
effective to justify the provision's existence.
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caretaker is allowed the EID and finds employment, the family's
AFDC payment would decrease by the amount of the new earned
income minus the amount disregarded. Thus, program costs
would decrease.44 On the other hand, if the EID is denied and
the caretaker does not work,45 the family's AFDC payments will
remain the same.46
No apparent justification exists for denying the EID to
caretakers who are not direct recipients of AFDC. Allowance of
the EID would not encourage increased cheating, 4 only increased
working. -It would neither weaken the family structure 48 nor in-
crease long-term program costs. Moreover, granting the EID to
44 Short-term costs could arguably increase if the expense of allowing the disregard to
presently working caretakers exceeded the amount saved by the additional earned income
of newly employed caretakers. Long-term costs would presumably decrease as caretakers'
earnings increased family resources towards self-sufficiency levels. The economic and
human dignity benefits that would result from the new employment, however, justify the
possibility of increased short-term costs. The possibility of increased costs did not deter
Congress in 1967 and should not serve as a basis for a restrictive policy today. Further-
more, the suggested policy would not affect program costs if the caretaker decided not to
work.
15 Under these circumstances, many caretakers will choose not to work. See note 35 and
accompanying text supra.
46 In addition, there is no other incentive available in the program to encourage
caretakers who are not direct recipients to work. If a direct recipient caretaker wrongly
decides not to work, the state agency can cut his benefits. If the caretaker is not a direct
recipient, the state's hands are tied because the agency may not penalize direct recipient
children to punish caretakers who "wrongly" remain unemployed. See note 30 supra.
'7 First, the approach posited by this Note would not provide any incentive for an
individual to lie in order to qualify for the EID. The incentive to defraud only exists with
respect to qualification for direct payments. Second, application of the EID reduces the
incentive for the mother to misuse earned income designated by the welfare agency for
support of her children; the disregard allows her to keep some earned income. The argu-
ment that the caretaker will probably spend the disregarded income at the racetrack is
inapposite. The misallocation of AFDC payments is really a problem concerning the misuse
of direct welfare payments and family income designated by the welfare agency for the
support of direct recipients. This potential for abuse exists regardless of the application of
the EID. The purpose of the EID is to allow the mother to spend the disregarded income
for her personal benefit without reducing the funds available for the children's support.
Moreover, often the caretaker will spend the retained income on items that benefit the.
entire family.
4' The AFDC program already encourages a welfare parent to hide the presence of a
paramour in the house and to avoid remarriage. If an AFDC parent remarries, or receives
support from a paramour, the state will apply the paramour's income to reduce AFDC
payments to the family. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. Policy dictates this result
because AFDC payments should only go to financially "needy" persons. By denying
the EID to the caretaker, the state encourages the caretaker to fraudulently hide the
paramour to avoid a reduction of family benefits. On the other hand, allowance of the EID
discourages this type of fraud because the working parent gets the EID regardless of the
paramour's presence.
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caretakers who are not direct recipients would give many un-
employed caretakers an incentive to work and ultimately reduce
the number of individuals requiring direct AFDC support.
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